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INTRODUCTION
Most observers  accept  that regional  trade  liberalization  and multilat-
eral trade liberalization  are not necessarily mutually exclusive and, in fact, can
be mutually reenforcing.  It  is  also generally  recognized  that while regional
trade agreements  are technically  easier to negotiate  (they certainly do not take
as long  to finish) and often go deeper and wider in their policy coverage,  there
are  still  limits  as to  how  far  a regional  trade agreement  can  go  when  all the
major players are  not around the same negotiating  table.
The  NAFTA Agreement,  as  it relates  to  agriculture,  is  a  classic  ex-
ample of the opportunities and limitations inherent in a regional free trade agree-
ment.  The following negotiating  history  explains why.
MARKET  ACCESS  PROVISIONS  OF NAFTA
At first glance,  the Agricultural  Chapter of the NAFTA Agreement  is
curious.  In effect, it stitches together three separate bilateral agreements under
a trilateral chapeau.  In other words, some of the provisions  are asymmetrical
between  member countries  and commodities.Gifford  7
The reason for this outcome can be traced to the first negotiating  ses-
sion of the Canada/U.S.  Free Trade Agreement(CUSTA).  At this  1986 meet-
ing, both  Canada  and the United  States  made it  crystal clear  that they were
proceeding on the premise that while their mutual objective was to try to elimi-
nate  all agricultural tariffs,  the most sensitive  existing  quantitative  import re-
strictions would remain. This in fact is what finally occurred.  Canada retained
its GATT Article XI Import Quotas on dairy, poultry and eggs, while the United
States  maintained  its  existing  Section  22 Import  Quotas  on  dairy,  sugar and
peanuts.  Both  countries  agreed,  however,  to eliminate  their respective  meat
import  laws on bilateral trade and  Canada  agreed to eliminate,  on a bilateral
basis, its import licenses on wheat, barley and oats once U.S.  support levels fell
to those of Canada.
The Canada/U.S.  negotiations  were ultimately  successful in eliminat-
ing all normal agricultural tariffs but the most sensitive import quotas remained.
This was the deal which emerged in  1987 and this is the deal which a NAFTA
panel  subsequently confirmed  when the United States tried  to argue later that
the Uruguay  Round  obligation to convert  quotas into tariff equivalents could
not apply  bilaterally  because of the  original  FTA obligation  to  eliminate  all
(ordinary) tariffs.
The NAFTA negotiations were different from the original Canada/U.S.
negotiations.  Early in the NAFTA negotiations, the United States and Mexico
agreed to tariffy  all import quotas and phaseout  all ordinary tariffs  and tariff
equivalents.  Why?  My  own  assessment  is  that both  the United  States  and
Mexico  quickly  recognized that  if Mexico  tried  to  protect its most sensitive
sectors(cor  and dried beans),  the United States would be under extreme pres-
sure  to protect  tomatoes,  sugar and any other product  a politically influential
group  wanted  to  add.  The  bottom  line was that it was  easier for the United
States  and  Mexico  to negotiate  and  sell a  noexceptions  market  access  result
than to try to negotiate and contain a list of exceptions.
Because  the NAFTA  negotiations  were concluding  before the end of
the Uruguay Round, the U.S./Mexico  "No Exceptions" Agreement put Canada
in a box.  Canada did not want to prejudice  its GATT negotiating  position  on
"strengthening  and clarifying Article XI."  If you recall your Uruguay  Round
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negotiating history, Canada did not agree to tariffication until December 1993,
well  after the  conclusion  of the NAFTA negotiations.  Consequently,  Canada
and the United  States decided  to simply incorporate  the original Canada/U.S.
Agricultural Agreement  into NAFTA  without  changes  and to negotiate  sepa-
rate bilateral  agreements  with Mexico.  Following  conclusion  of the Uruguay
Round,  the  practical  market  access  obligations  between  Canada and Mexico
are nearly identical to the Canada/U.S. situation, i.e., agreement to phaseout all
import duties except those on dairy, poultry, eggs and sugar.
In  summary,  while  100  percent of U.S./Mexico  agricultural  trade  is
scheduled to become duty  free, Canada/U.S.  and Canada/Mexico  agricultural
trade  is still  subject to tariffs  or tariff rate  quotas  on a relatively  short list of
sensitive commodities.  Of course, the vast bulk of trade is  duty free or in the
process  of becoming duty free.
So far the  discussion has dealt with  only the market access  provisions
of NAFTA.  However, it is worth noting what happened  in other key areas,  par-
ticularly,  export  subsidies,  domestic  support  and  sanitary  and  phytosanitary
measures.
OTHER  KEY AREAS
Export Subsidies. The NAFTA produced  a mixture of bilateral and
trilateral  obligations.  Export subsidies  are prohibited in Canada/U.S.  agricul-
tural trade but are permitted vis-a-vis Mexico.  The reason for this was that the
United States wanted to reserve the right to use export subsidies vis-a-vis Mexico
in order to meet subsidized European  competition.
Domestic  Subsidies.  With  respect  to  domestic  subsidies,  it  was
agreed in the Canada/U.S.  negotiations  and confirmed in the NAFTA negotia-
tions that disciplines on domestic  support (like export subsidies to third coun-
tries) were best left to multilateral negotiations where the European Union (EU)
subsidy  practices  would also be on the table.
Sanitary and Physosanitary (SPS)  Measures.  I think it is fair
to  say  that one  of the most  significant  accomplishments  of the Canada/U.S.
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negotiations  was  the  path  breaking  agreement  on  sanitary  and
phytosanitary(SPS)  measures, which provided a blueprint for the Uruguay Round
and NAFTA Agreements on this issue.  Throughout all three negotiations,  there
was an explicit recognition that tariff liberalization must not be circumvented
by the  inappropriate  use of SPS  measures  while  upholding  the right  to take
legitimate measures to protect human,  plant and animal  health.
Of course, duty  free trade does not mean that import duties or quotas
cannot be reintroduced under specified circumstances.  Under NAFTA the three
members retain their WTO rights to apply anti-dumping,  countervailing or safe-
guard duties and,  in the case of safeguards,  import quotas. This to my mind is
one  of the key  differences  between Europe  and  North America.  In the  EU
there is  no  provision  for the  use of trade  remedies  on  intra-European  trade.
Common agricultural and competition policies have  enabled Europe  to forego
the use of trade remedies.  They are, however,  still a factor, and unfortunately,
a  growing  factor in  intra-North American  trade,  particularly  with respect  to
anti-dumping  investigations.
In all three trade remedy situations, provisional import measures  may
be applied pending a final determination of injury.  Thus, for the NAFTA  mem-
bers, trade remedy measures  are two-edged  swords.  They can be used to pro-
tect domestic industries;  and,  they can  also be used to impair access to export
markets.
The recent anti-dumping actions on live cattle from Canada to the United
States and beef from the United  States to Mexico  clearly  indicate  the vulner-
ability of highly integrated  sectors  to the various weapons in the trade remedy
arsenal.  Of particular concern  to exporting  sectors is the increasing  tendency
for the anti-dumping  authorities  to use constructed costs of production  in de-
termining whether dumping  is occurring.  Given the elimination  of import du-
ties, it is not very often that one can demonstrate export sales at below domestic
prices.  However,  it is  sometimes  all too  easy  to demonstrate,  in the case  of
agricultural  products  (which  are  subject  to  major  seasonal  or cyclical  price
fluctuations),  that export prices are below some calculated cost of production.
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The NAFTA  governments are caught on the horns of a dilemma.  They
want to give their  import sensitive  sectors the right to have their day in  court
while at the same time preventing their trading partners from using trade rem-
edies as a "legitimate"  form of trade protection and harassment.  This a debate
which has only started but I predict it will become an increasingly contentious
issue in NAFTA  agricultural  trade relations.
A CUSTOMS  UNION  AND A FREE  TRADE AREA
One of the key differences  between  a customs union and a free trade
area is that common policies are not a feature of the latter while they are of the
former.  However,  the experience  of the NAFTA  Agreements  suggests  that,
while members can maintain national policies,  they should be reasonably com-
patible  with one another.
Some policies are clearly  incompatible.  For example, although it was
not an explicit part of the Canada/U.S.  Agreement,  Canada's  two-price  policy
for wheat could not continue  in the face of duty  free entry of flour,  bread and
biscuits.  Thus, before the bilateral agreement came into force  Canada had no
choice but to eliminate this policy if it wanted to retain its milling and baking
industry.
Of course,  changes  to  domestic  policies  which are  taken  mainly  for
national  and/or  multilateral  reasons can  sometimes  have  effects  on  regional
trade patterns.  For example, the elimination of Canada's  grain transportation
subsidies (something  U.S. grain interests had complained about for years), had
the  effect  of lowering  grain  prices  in  the Prairies.  This not  only  stimulated
livestock  production  in  Western  Canada,  it made  the  U.S.  market relatively
more attractive  as  a  market  for  Canadian  unprocessed  grain  and oilseed  ex-
ports.
I realize  I am starting  to stray into the area of the impact of  NAFTA
trade flows and that is  the topic  of a number of papers  which follow,  but it is
necessary  to emphasize  the  linkage between  domestic policies  and trade,  and
the impact this has had on the structure of existing trade agreements as well as
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the direct and indirect constraints that trade agreements are having on domestic
policies.
NAFTA has left each country with a right to develop domestic agricul-
tural  policies  which best  suit  their respective  social,  economic  and political
imperatives.  However,  as  a practical  matter, this policy  freedom can be con-
strained by the regional trade agreement within  which our respective  agricul-
tural economies operate.  I have already referred to Canada's necessity to elimi-
nate  its two-price  wheat policy.  Another example,  would be the difficulty the
United States would face if it reintroduced wheat export subsidies.  This would
have the practical effect of sucking more wheat imports  into the United States
from Canada.
Growing differences  in domestic support levels in one country relative
to its trading partners are bound to cause trade relation problems. Demands for
support parity  and/or  trade  remedy  import protection  are  the natural  conse-
quences of major divergencies  in support levels.  Over time, therefore, domes-
tic  agricultural  policies  in  NAFTA  must be  on  a converging  course  if trade
frictions  are to be minimized.
CONCLUSION
When  all is said and done, trade policy  is a means to a domestic end.
All NAFTA  members share a common  goal of facilitating the growth of their
respective  agricultural  sectors.  One means of achieving this goal is to negoti-
ate improvements  in the regional  and multilateral  trading  environments.  We
have  come a long  way regionally.  We still have  a much longer journey  to go
multilaterally.  However,  the NAFTA  Agreements  demonstrate  what  can  be
achieved when countries choose to reduce trade barriers and facilitate trade.  I
will leave it to the papers that follow  to quantify  the effects.  However,  as an
unabashed biased observer, I do not have to be convinced that NAFTA is oper-
ating to the overall benefit of agricultural producers and processors  in each of
the three member countries.
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